

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PAPER

Preventing Violence and Promoting Active Bystandership and Peace: My Life in Research and Applications

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In this article, I describe some of my research on caring, helping, active bystandership, and the origins of genocide and collective violence, as a background to interventions in real-world settings aimed to create positive change. They include working with teachers to create classrooms that promote caring and helping; training police to prevent or stop unnecessary harmful actions by fellow officers, and similarly students in schools to prevent harmful actions; promoting reconciliation, using trainings and workshops, and educational radio programs in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo; working to improve Dutch–Muslim relations in Amsterdam after violence; and a number of other projects. In these projects, information and participants' experiences combined to create "experiential understanding." Evaluation studies showed positive effects. These projects and their evaluation show that research- and theory-based interventions can be effective. An initial motivation for this work was my early childhood experience during the Holocaust in Hungary and receiving help from bystanders.

Public Significance Statement

This review of research, interventions, and applications in real-world settings shows that research on helping behavior and on the origins of great violence by groups can be applied to prevent violence, for example, by police or by students who would bully, and to help groups reconcile after great violence, for example, the genocide in Rwanda. It shows that knowledge gained in research can be used to make a difference in the world.

Keywords: evolution of violence and of helping, passive and active bystanders, the roots of genocide, promoting reconciliation in Rwanda, preventing police violence and bullying by students

I spent almost all of my professional life, starting in the mid-1960s, studying the roots of goodness (helping, caring about other people's welfare, moral courage, and active bystandership) and the roots of evil (the influences leading to genocide and mass killing, and, to a lesser extent, violent conflict and terrorism). I also engaged in activities both to increase caring, helping, and active bystandership, and to prevent harm and violence and promote reconciliation after great violence.

This article is primarily about the applications of research and theory, mainly my own but also others', to real-world settings. It originates from a talk I gave at the National Summit on Violence

in November 2016 at the American Psychological Association offices in Washington, D.C. The editor of this journal was present and invited me to write an article describing the "interventions" my associates and I have conducted in varied settings, my experiences along the way, and the lessons I learned, in the hope that it would help others doing similar work. He suggested that I could do this in an autobiographical manner.

I begin by considering the roots in my early experience of my lifelong commitment to such work. Next, I briefly describe some of my research and theory, which guided the applications. The applications range from working with teachers to create class-

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increase caring, helping, moral courage, active bystandership and altruism born of suffering, and the roots of, or societal, cultural and psychological influences leading to genocide, mass killing and intractable violent conflict and ways to prevent these. In addition to studying these he worked in many real world settings, for example to promote reconciliation after a genocide in Rwanda, improve Dutch Muslim relations in the Netherlands after violence there, training police in active bystandership to prevent fellow officers from doing unnecessary harm, and creating classrooms that promote caring.

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rooms in which children learn to be caring and helpful, to making proposals to the city administration of Amsterdam to improve Dutch-Muslim relations after violence between the groups there; to working with police to create active bystandership—officers acting to prevent or stop the use of unnecessary force or other unlawful actions by fellow officers; to training students in schools to be active bystanders who prevent or stop bullying of fellow students; to promoting healing and reconciliation in Rwanda after the genocide of 1994 to improve lives and prevent further violence, and the extension of this work from Rwanda to Burundi and the Congo. I also write about formulating some lectures to groups—for example, in Belgrade during the violence in Bosnia—to have an educational impact relevant to prevention. Another aspect of my autobiographical approach will be to describe in each case how my engagement came about—working with police, working in Rwanda, and so on.

The Origins of My Motivation: Early Experiences With Evil and Goodness

The original impetus for my engagement in research on “goodness” and “evil” came from my earliest experiences. I was a 6-year-old Jewish boy in Hungary at the worst of times, during the Holocaust. At that time, I experienced evil but was also the recipient of goodness. Once I began this work, my motivation and engagement evolved further. As my own and others’ research shows, people learn by doing, change as a result of their own actions, both in negative and positive directions (Staub, 1989a, 2015).

Hungary started to pass anti-Semitic laws in 1920, and at the time of World War II was a voluntary ally of Germany. Still, there was no killing of Jews through the spring of 1944. Then the Germans found out that the Hungarian ruler had reached out to the allies in the hope of a creating a separate peace. They responded by occupying Hungary in March 1944. I happened to be on a main street of Budapest when the Germans arrived. Maria, a woman who worked for my family, and I were pushing my baby sister in a carriage when we heard the roar, and then saw the German tanks rolling into the city. In the summer of 1944, Adolf Eichman, 50 SS members, and about 200,000 Hungarian police, gendarmes, and volunteers gathered the Jewish population from the countryside, about 450,000 people, packed them into wagons and sent them to Auschwitz, where most of them were immediately killed (Braham, 1997, 2014). The Jews of Budapest were to be next.

Raoul Wallenberg, a Swede, a relatively poor member of a rich and distinguished family, was a partner of a Hungarian Jew in Sweden in an export-import firm. He agreed to come to Hungary to try to save lives. As a neutral country, Sweden had some influence. He was appointed a diplomat and, in Hungary, created a “protective pass” that said that the bearer would become a Swedish citizen after the war, and during the war was under the protection of Sweden. My father and uncle were in forced labor camps. My mother and aunt stood in line in front of the Swedish embassy and succeeded in getting these documents for us. The Hungarian government agreed to respect a limited number of them, but Wallenberg created many more.

He bought up apartment houses in Budapest and had the people with these letters of protection move in there. As I later learned, he

was totally invested in saving lives, running next to and on the top of trains crowded with Jews to be taken away while being shot at, trying to hand letters of protection to people. The Nazis also tried to kill him in a car “accident.” The Soviet army, as it liberated Budapest in early 1945, made him disappear. There is speculation but no real knowledge about why the Soviets took him into custody. My belief is that Wallenberg had developed some influence in Budapest, and the Soviets did not want to have anyone around who might interfere with their plans for Hungary. He apparently died in a prison in Moscow, probably in 1947.

In the second part of 1944, Hungarian Nazis, the Arrow Cross, were gathering Jews in the streets of Budapest, taking them to the Danube, sometimes tying several people together, shooting some, and pushing them all into the river. They often raided the “protected houses,” taking people away because they did not have a protective pass, or for other—to us, unclear—reasons.

Rather than abandoning us, Maria, the Christian woman who worked for my family, came with us to the protected house. She prepared dough, took it to a bakery in a baby carriage, and then brought the bread back. Once Arrow Cross members stopped her, made her stand against the wall with her hands up for hours, and threatened to kill her for helping Jews. An Arrow Cross member who knew her arrived and told the others to let her go.

She continued helping, baking bread and also procuring other food, as before. She also took a copy of a letter of protection to my father in the countryside, asking someone standing inside their camp’s barbed wire fence to call him, and handed him the letter. Although it was probably useless to him, it may have given him confidence. He escaped during a stopover in Budapest as his group was taken to Germany. He was its only survivor.

He came to our “protected house.” One day I saw a group of black-uniformed men marching down the street. I shouted, “They are coming!” My mother told my father to sit in the corner of the room, pushed an armchair over him and threw a blanket over the chair. The black-uniformed Hungarian Nazis thoroughly searched the small apartment but did not find him. I was 6 years old at the time. I have vivid memories of what happened, can see the men looking in drawers and closets, but not the feelings I had at the time. But these experiences gave me models of acting on others’ and one’s own behalf, and, I think, showed me that it is possible to act effectively.

After the war, Hungary was under Communist rule. In October 1956, there was a revolution. The Communists did not allow people to leave the country, but now the borders were less guarded. I was 18 years old and escaped with a close friend of my age and his 2-years-older brother, 3 weeks after Soviet troops put down the revolt. My parents were too old (55 and 60) and too impacted by their traumatic lives during the Holocaust—and also during the Communist era, when the small clothing store they restarted after the war was nationalized—for the adventure of escape and starting a new life. My 13-year-old sister was too young to take along. She later became ill. I saw them all again for the first time 10 years later, after I became a U.S. citizen, which made it safer to return, and had my first job and could afford to travel. I then continued to go to Hungary, even after my parents and sister died, visiting Maria. I was with her when she died in January 1991.

I lived in Vienna for close to 3 years, with my friends, much of the time in a house set up for Hungarian refugee students by a Danish organization, studying at universities for part of this time.

Then in 1959, I received a visa to the United States. My friends decided to stay in Vienna. I ended up in Minnesota and managed to get into the university, where I studied psychology. I went to graduate school at Stanford University. All this time, I thought little about the Holocaust and issues of goodness and evil. I was doing research with Walter Mischel on delay of gratification, and taking courses with Al Bandura, Eleanor Maccoby, and Leon Festinger, and with Arnold Lazarus, a visiting professor who was an early cognitive behavior therapist.

During my second year at Stanford, I became a tennis partner and friend of another visiting professor, Perry London. He and a couple of his associates conducted the first study of rescuers, European Christians who endangered themselves to save the lives of Jews during the Holocaust. They had important initial findings (London, 1970) but could not continue their research because no one would fund it. They were told, in 1962 to 1963, that too much time had passed to learn reliably about the motivation and characteristics of rescuers. It took quite a while for people to have enough emotional distance from the horrors of the Holocaust to seriously study it. As the Holocaust received more public attention, social scientists returned to the study of rescuers, with important studies appearing beginning in the 1980s (Fogelman, 1994; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Tec, 1986).

My Research on Helping and Positive Bystandership

The conversations with Perry London inspired me to begin to study positive behavior. With the empirical orientation I received at Stanford, I wanted to do this experimentally, in a measurable way. In my first job at Harvard University starting in 1965, I began to do research on children's sharing behavior (Staub & Noerenberg, 1981; Staub & Sherk, 1970). Then, inspired by Latane and Darley's (1970) studies of bystander behavior, I did a series of studies of children and adults helping (or not helping) when they heard a crash and sounds of distress from an adjoining room. I also studied emergency helping with other designs. I will briefly review a few results here that are especially relevant to my later work, in part by applying principles derived from them to real-world situations.

In one study with children (Staub, 1970b), helping increased from kindergarten to first grade, and then to second grade; remained at about the same level in fourth grade; and then sharply decreased in sixth grade to about the level of kindergarteners. As we saw this surprising decline in helping, we began to ask children about the reasons for their actions. They said things like, "I thought I was not supposed to stop working on my task" and "I did not think I was allowed to go into the other room." It seemed that children learned conventional rules of behavior but not that, under certain circumstances, caring or moral principles override them.

To explore this further, I conducted a study in which seventh graders were working on a drawing (Staub, 1971). Some were told nothing (no information), others were told not to go into the adjoining room because someone else was working there on a task (prohibition), and some were told they could go into the adjoining room if they needed more drawing pencils (permission condition). While working on their drawing, children heard a crash and sounds of distress from the adjoining room. Children in the first two groups helped with exactly the same frequency, a little over 25%. Children in the permission condition helped almost 90% of the

time. It seems that no information functioned as a prohibition, as with sixth graders in the previous study. Following conventional rules, which would be specific to a group's culture, may be an inhibitor of helping by adults as well. Among police, such a rule seems to be "Support your fellow officer no matter what he or she is doing," including the use of unnecessary force.

In the study of helping varying with children's age (Staub, 1970b), we also explored whether children show the "bystander effect": Latane and Darley (1970) had shown that the presence of other bystanders makes it less likely that any one bystander helps. We had children hear the distress sounds from the adjoining room either alone or in pairs and found that kindergarteners and first graders did not show this effect. When they heard distress sound in pairs, they began to talk about it and joined together in action. But this disappeared by second grade. Perhaps this change is also the result of environmental influence, children learning to hide their reactions in public, or learning to feel less responsible when another child is present.

In another study, the helpful example of an adult made it more likely that children helped, as did warm interactions compared with neutral interactions with an adult (Staub, 1970a). There is a good amount of research showing that parental warmth, especially when combined with appropriate guidance, contributes to positive behavior (Eisenberg, Eggum-Wilkens, & Spinrad, 2015; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006; Staub, 1979). In one study, when children interacted with a warm adult, they remembered more the positive behavior of diorama figures; when they engaged with an indifferent adult, they remembered more the diorama figures' negative actions (Yarrow & Scott, 1972).

Some people try to avoid information about the need to help. In one study, a confederate, one of my students at Harvard, collapsed on a quiet street in Cambridge when someone was approaching either on the same side or the other side of the street. Helping was less when the bystander passed on the other side. But some people approaching on the other side immediately rushed over. Others hesitated and, while they did so, sometimes new passersby arrived and helped. A phenomenon that emerged was that some passersby looked away after a single glance, never looking back, and some of them turned off the street at the next corner (Staub & Baer, 1974). In my later work, I found that avoiding information, presumably to lessen feelings of responsibility or guilt for inaction, happens in various settings, such as with bystanders inside and outside a country in the course of increasing hostility and violence (Staub, 1989a, 2011). As a result, I have defined bystanders as people who are in a *position* to know what is happening and in a *position* to take action (Staub, 2005).

Witnesses have substantial power to influence events. In one of my studies, what a confederate said in response to sounds of distress from another room greatly influenced helping by another person, the study participant. The frequency of help was lowest, about 25%, when the confederate said that the sounds may be from another study and, at any rate, were irrelevant to them. When the confederate said in response to the crash and distress sounds, "That sounds bad, maybe we should do something; you go into the other room and I'll find the person in charge," and left the room through another door, every participant went into the room where the sounds came from (Staub, 1974, Section VII). A witness defining the meaning of events and appropriate behavior appears to have powerful influence.

Both circumstances and personality matter in helping. Both can be a source of responsibility to help. The research by Latane and Darley (1970) on the bystander effect showed a situational influence. The presence of other bystanders made it less likely that any one bystander helped. Also, in a study with kindergarteners and first graders who were working on a drawing, the adult, before leaving the room, said, "Someone else is working in the other room; if anything happens, you are in charge." First graders who received this message were more likely to help than those who did not (Staub, 1970a).

In a series of studies, my students and I assessed what I have called *prosocial value orientation* (PVO). It has three primary elements: a positive view of human nature, concern about others' welfare, and, most important, feelings of and belief in one's responsibility to help others. Weeks later, we put each participant into a situation where there was a need to help someone either in physical or psychological distress. In the study with physical distress (Staub, 1974), a person working alone on a task heard groaning from an adjoining room. If the study participant did not go into that room, the distressed person came into their room. This person, saying that he had a stomach ailment, offered several opportunities to help, graded in the effort required (Staub, 1974). Participants with a stronger PVO helped earlier and expended more effort.

I conducted this first study on the relationship between the personal disposition PVO and helping at Harvard. My students and I conducted further studies on this after I moved to the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in 1971. In a study of psychological distress, a study participant and a confederate were working separately on the same task. The material they worked with described a distress situation. In response, the confederate talked about something that happened to her, expressing more or less severe psychological distress (Feinberg, 1978; see Staub, 1978, 1980). Greater PVO was again associated with more helping when the person was in greater distress. Helping in this case meant primarily stopping work and attending to the distressed person.

In these studies, we measured PVO by a combination of tests that we factor analyzed, which provided a strong summary measure. I then developed a test specifically to measure it, in response to a request by the magazine *Psychology Today* to publish a test on values and helping (Staub, 1989b). Over 7,000 people returned the completed questionnaire. PVO was strongly associated with varied forms of self-reported helping, including subtle indicators like the time that has passed since you last helped. The association was even stronger with a combination of PVO and belief in one's capacity to improve others' welfare (intended as a measure of competence). Items with just feelings of responsibility to help and competence were also strongly associated with helping (an article on this study was already in galley to be published in *Psychology Today*, when the magazine stopped publication for several years; but see Staub, 2003).

In further research, working with children in Amherst schools, I explored how children can become more caring and helpful as they are guided to engage in helpful behavior, and "learn by doing," change as a result of their own actions (Staub, 1979, 2015). The anthropologists Whiting and Whiting (1975) found in their study of six cultures that in groups in which children have responsibilities that contribute to the welfare of the group, such as tending animals or taking care of younger siblings, they are more helpful.

In societies in which they do not have such responsibilities, they are more egoistic, seeking and accepting help. Children were least helpful in the one U.S. city they studied, in the Northeast, in which their only responsibility was to take care of their room.

Because there may be other aspects of societies that contribute to the differences in helpfulness, I conducted a series of experiments to assess learning by doing in children. Fifth and sixth graders were taught to make toys, received materials, and spent four 40-min periods making toys for poor hospitalized children. This increased later helping. What Hoffman (2000) called "induction," pointing out to children the negative consequences of their behavior on other people, contributes to the development of empathy in young children (Yarrow & Waxler, 1976). I assumed that pointing out positive consequences would also have beneficial effects. In some conditions, the positive reactions of children who received the toys were described to participants, which increased later helping. In another study, fifth and sixth graders taught second and third graders, which led to more later helping by the teachers. This was more the case when the interactions were positive. In each case, these positive results were found compared with control conditions with similar activities that did not benefit anyone.

The children who engaged in helpful behavior later helped more, for example, by assembling photos and stories cut out of magazines or written down by them, and then creating packages of them for poor hospitalized children (Staub, 1979; see also Staub, 2015). Studying genocide, I later found that learning by doing and evolution is also a central characteristic of societies moving toward great violence (Staub, 1989a).

Studying the Roots of Violence, Primarily by Groups

After a decade-and-a-half study of the roots of positive behavior and ways to increase it, I was emotionally ready to look at the dark side: the roots of violence between groups, especially genocide and mass killing. I also thought that my prior work had relevance: For example, I assumed and found that bystanders relinquishing responsibility contributes to genocide. I was concerned that by moving from experimental research on positive behavior to doing research in the way necessary to study genocide as a societal process, I would become an outsider, given the strong methodological focus in academic psychology at that time on experimental research. But my motivation at this point was strong. A somewhat rare, overt reaction to this shift was at a lecture I gave at the University of Trier, in Germany, in 1987. I was invited to talk about my research on altruism. I asked if I could instead talk about the roots of genocide. One of the first questions after my talk was whether it was psychologically challenging for me to give up experimental research to study genocide.

In addition to turning, around 1980, to this new field of study and the new approach it required, starting at the end of the 1980s I increasingly engaged in projects outside the university that aimed to bring about change. My colleagues in social and personality psychology and in the Department of Psychology in general did not indicate any problem with my shift. A few seemed to appreciate this new direction in my work. I published three books between 1978 and 1980, began to study genocide and mass violence after that, and for a while I published less, because I was working hard on research in this new field and my first book on

this topic, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (hereafter, *The Roots of Evil*; Staub, 1989a). I remember that my yearly personnel committee evaluation had suffered during this period.

I worked with graduate students who approached me, but I felt inhibited in attracting graduate students because my work was so different from what they envisioned when they applied for our program in social and personality psychology. I was also concerned about their job prospects. This changed the last years of my university career, because with the help of anonymous donors, I was able to start a doctoral program in the *psychology of peace and violence*. This attracted outstanding graduate students who entered the program deeply interested in the issues I was engaged with. When they received their doctoral degrees, they found good jobs.

My family was also affected by my shift in research. I had books lying about with dead people on the cover. Whenever they noticed a program about violence on TV, not fictional but real, my sons, Adrian and Daniel, would call to me saying, "Dad, there is something related to your work on TV!"

Two more events during my visit at the University of Trier are especially relevant to the study of group violence. One was another question—at this University in Germany, a professor of education asked, "But is there not something wrong with the Jews, given that they were always persecuted in the course of history," showing the persistence of devaluation. In Ancient Rome, it was Christians who were thrown to the lions. Later the Church identifying the Jews as Christ killers, and focused on converting them, led to intense discrimination and a long history of persecution. Another event was a meeting with a group of Germans who were at least teenagers at the time Hitler came to power, which I asked my hosts to arrange. In talking about their lives under Hitler, the people in this group again and again returned to talking about the satisfactions of life at the time, sitting around campfires, singing songs. It took time and effort for them to recover memories of the very public persecution of Jews (Staub, 1989a).

My approach to the study of genocide and mass violence was to analyze the history and group relations in societies in which genocide or mass killing has been perpetrated, applying knowledge gained from psychological research and theory. Then I developed a conception to explain the roots of such violence and applied it to new instances. I studied the Holocaust, the genocide of the Armenians, the autogenocide (killing of Khmer by Khmer) and genocide against minorities in Cambodia, and a mass killing, the disappearances in Argentina (Staub, 1989a). Later I studied the genocide in Rwanda (Staub, 1999, 2011) and, in less depth, the mass killing in Bosnia (Staub, 1996b). To explore the applicability of principles I identified, I also studied the intractable violent conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, and both Palestinian and Al Qaeda terrorism (Staub, 2011). Along the way, I increasingly worked on developing an understanding of how groups may reconcile after (or before) extreme violence, and the prevention of such violence (Staub, 2011, 2014, 2015).

The starting points for great violence between groups such as genocide and mass killing are a combination of a number of instigating conditions (Staub, 1989a; see also Staub, 2011). A primary one is difficult life conditions in a society, such as economic decline, great political disorganization, and rapid, large-scale social change. Another primary influence is persistent and intense group conflict. These all frustrate core psychological needs

for security, positive identity, the capacity to influence events, connections to other people, and understanding the world and one's own place in it. The basic human needs theory that I developed (Staub, 1989a, 2003, 2015) is a derivative of, but also different from, Maslow's (1971) theory of human needs.

The frustration of basic needs results in psychological and social processes, such as scapegoating some group for one's life problems, and creating (destructive) ideologies. The latter are visions of a better future and way of life for the group, which become destructive as they identify enemies who stand in the way of their fulfillment. These visions can be quite varied, ranging from nationalism, a frequent one, to a combination of nationalism (expansion of Lebensraum or life space/territory), racial superiority, and submission to a supreme leader, which was the Nazi ideology, to total social equality, the ideology of the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge identified groups of people as enemies who they believed would not be willing to contribute to or live in a society of equality. This included intellectuals. Hostile actions against the scapegoat or ideological enemy can start an evolution of increasing violence—steps along a continuum of destruction. In the course of this evolution, individuals change, the standards of behavior toward a target group change, and institutions are created to serve persecution and violence (Staub, 1989a, 2011).

Experimental research also shows such evolution. For example, Buss (1966) found that "teachers" who were to punish learners for mistakes on a task progressively increased the level of shocks they administered. A study by Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson (1975) showed that overhearing the derogation of some people leads to more intense punitive responses to them, and that this effect appears increasingly over trials.

The existence of certain cultural and political characteristics of a society makes such evolution more likely. Of central importance is a history of division between subgroups and the devaluation of some group, usually a minority. They tend to become the scapegoat and identified as the ideological enemy. Harm done to this group is justified, at least in part, by increasing devaluation of the group and also by its necessity for fulfilling the ideology. Another cultural element is past victimization or other great group trauma. This creates insecurity and makes the world look dangerous. The group then responds intensely to real or perceived threats, which can lead to unnecessary "defensive" violence (Staub, 1996a, 2011). Another contributor is the absence of pluralism, due to culture and excessive respect for authority, or an autocratic system. In societies that perpetrate mass violence, there is usually a strongly hierarchical social system, with obedience to adults stressed in child rearing, and to leaders in adults' behavior. The absence of pluralism and overly strong respect for authority make active bystandership to resist the evolution of hostility and violence less likely. Leaders who propagate scapegoating, destructive ideologies and violence, their followers, and also passive bystanders have important roles in the unfolding of the processes that lead to violence.

Prevention requires active, constructive responses to the instigating conditions, both by people within the country (e.g., Roosevelt's work programs during the depression), and outsiders who can provide support and material help. It requires generating constructive psychological and social responses, such as resisting scapegoating, and generating a constructive, inclusive ideology. It requires addressing the cultural characteristics that make violence more likely. Humanizing previously devalued groups and healing

from past group victimization and other trauma, and from the persistent psychological and cultural wounds that result from them, are among important processes of prevention. Prevention requires active bystanders, both to resist the influences that lead to violence and to promote positive processes (Staub, 2011, 2015).

Understanding both the influences that lead to extreme violence and avenues to prevention contributes to healing from past trauma (see section on Reconciliation and the Prevention of Violence) and may lead people to engage as active bystanders. Reconciliation, the development of more positive attitudes toward each other by all parties, also requires deep, meaningful contact (Deutsch, Coleman, & Marcus, 2014; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). It requires identifying and working together for shared goals. It requires the creation of a shared history in place of the conflicting histories of the past, or at least understanding and some acceptance of other groups having their own views of the past (Staub, 2011, 2014).

Applying Research and Theory I: Working With Teachers to Create Classrooms That Promote Caring and Helping

Scientists, including research psychologists, have traditionally been interested in causation, relationships, and principles that describe reality. That has also been an interest for me, but from the start, I was also concerned about how we can create change and how we can improve the human condition. Even research I described that identified causation, for example, the influences that lead to mass violence, embodies the potential for creating change, by addressing those conditions. Some other research I have described was specifically about creating change, for example, engaging children to help others, thereby increasing their later helping. Given both my research on helping and violence for several decades, and my underlying motivation, I was ready and eager when opportunities arose to bring about change, and I sometimes looked for them. This orientation is consistent with, and might even be considered a central aspect of peace psychology.

At some point, I began to receive invitations to give lectures or workshops with teachers, occasionally parents, and sometimes whole schools on the origins of caring and helping in children. In some cases, these were in part to address ongoing issues. For example, in a high school in New Jersey, there was a basketball rivalry with another school, and during or after each game, there were fights. As part of talking about caring and helping, I addressed the issue of “us and them,” and how easily such divisions arise and can prevent caring and helping and lead to hostility and violence.

After the school shooting at Columbine on April 20, 1999, I was asked to assess positive and negative (bullying) interactions among students in a whole school district. We also assessed the frequency of active bystandership by students (very low) and how students felt about their lives in school. Even more than those who received many negative behaviors directed at them, students who were excluded (received both few positive and negative behaviors) felt bad about their lives at school. Bullied students who received active bystandership and students who acted as bystanders felt better about their school lives (Staub, Fellner, Barry, & Morange, 2003; Staub & Spielman, 2003). In a 1-day event, we then reported and discussed our research findings with the staff.

My engagements with teachers became more regular when Facing History and Ourselves invited me to do sessions in their summer teacher training programs, which I did for over 10 years, starting around 1991. Facing History is an organization that provides materials and training to teachers to use the Holocaust as a lens on how human cruelty comes about. The information guides students to see the role of individual human beings as passive bystanders, or their potential to prevent violence as active, caring, and courageous bystanders. Their work and mine had both similar substance and similar aims. But my job in this context was not to talk about violence and genocide. Instead, I engaged with teachers about the origins of prosocial behavior in children and proposed and discussed creating classrooms that provide children with experiences that generate caring and helping, and make violence less likely (see Staub, 2003, for a design of such classrooms).

Briefly, the central elements of what I had to say was that warmth, affection, and nurturance by parents, teachers, and peers create positive connections to human beings. This has to be accompanied by guidance in values, and rules derived from values, at least in part provided by reasoning and explanation. The guidance has to be effective in moving children to act on essential values and rules (what Baumrind, 1975, called *firm control*), but not harsh. The example of models is important. Guiding children to engage in helpful behavior, inside the classroom or outside of it, is an important way for developing caring and helping (Staub, 1979, 2015). Creating positive connections among children belonging to different groups, for example, through joint projects, including cooperative learning techniques (Aronson, Stephan, Sikes, Blaney, & Snapp, 1978), is important for developing caring across group lines.

These principles derive from laboratory research (see Eisenberg et al., 2006, 2015; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Staub, 1979, 2005, 2015). In addition, a large-scale study of heroic rescuers in Europe during the Holocaust showed that they grew up in families that practiced such child rearing. They also had one parent who was a humanitarian model. Moreover, many of these families did not draw a sharp line between ingroup and outgroup, for example, in Poland between Catholics, the main religious group, and others. They engaged with others, including Jews (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).

The teachers and I discussed being open to the cultural difference among children from varied backgrounds; creating opportunities for children to be helpful, so that they learn by doing; and finding ways for all children to experience being special—if not in academics, then by taking care of plants, having roles in plays, or in other ways. The teachers talked about relevant experiences. One teacher selected a student who had behavior problems to write on the blackboard the plans for the day every morning. Having this responsibility and special role changed the student's behavior. Another teacher described a collection in the school for a charitable cause. A student who previously stole something was extremely eager to go around the classrooms to collect the donations. Despite others' hesitation, the teacher selected him and reported a clear beneficial effect on the student.

One lesson I learned in this context, which I applied in my other work, was that engaging participants in trainings and workshops to contribute their expertise is of great benefit. Many have special, relevant knowledge. Many teachers have much more direct experience with students than academic researchers. Being an active part of training and combining ideas motivates everyone. A sec-

ond, related lesson was that weaving together research findings and knowledge based on them as well as knowledge based on practical experience leads to the best outcomes.

Applying Research and Theory II: Trainings in Active Bystandership—The Police and Schools

In 1989, I published *The Roots of Evil*, which was widely reviewed, including by some public media. Perhaps due to this exposure, a journalist from the *Los Angeles Times* called me after the Rodney King incident, in March 1991, and asked me how such events come about.

In that incident, Rodney King did not stop his car when a police officer tried to flag him down. The officer, and then more police cars, chased him. When they finally stopped him and pulled him out of his car, a number of police officers were beating him while he was lying on the ground, with 17 officers standing around watching. Although before cell phones, someone filmed this and sent it to a TV station, and it went viral around the world.

My comments were published in a front-page article (Scott, 1991). I was then invited to speak at a 1-day event addressing police violence, organized by Warren Christopher, later President Clinton's Secretary of State (Staub, 1992, 2001). After that, the California Peace Officers Standards and Training, the organization responsible for all police training in the state, invited me to develop a training for police academies to reduce the use of unnecessary force.

The training focused on developing active bystandership by police. The foundation for the training included my earlier work, for example, on the power of bystanders to influence others, as well as others' work, for example, on the inhibitors of active bystandership (Latane & Darley, 1970). Officers were to engage when their fellow officers got unnecessarily heated in an interaction. Entering into the interaction, taking over the engagement with a civilian, or acting to stop it when a fellow officer engaged in harmful or violent behavior were all part of the training.

Acting seemingly contrary to a fellow officer is in opposition to traditional police culture. Therefore, the training had to work on culture change. It had to transform the meaning of good teamwork, so that an officer preventing or stopping a fellow officer from harming an innocent civilian is seen as good teamwork and real loyalty. The training had to include superior officers, who potentially could punish active bystanders. Their support was essential for active bystandership to take hold. It was to use videos of role-plays of interventions as well as actual role playing in order to develop new skills and behavior strategies.

I delivered the training late summer in 1992 to a committee charged with addressing the conditions that led to the Rodney King event, consisting of community leaders and representatives as well police officers. After a 2-day meeting, the group reached a series of positive recommendations (without me in the room), one of which was that "The subject of intervention should be taught to all levels of police officers (Basic course through Executive Development)" (Staub, 1992; see also Staub, 2015). However, the group decided to use their internal staff for the application of the training to courses in the police academies, and I do not know how they applied it.

But I do know what the police in New Orleans have been doing. In 2014, Mary Howell, an attorney in New Orleans who knew about my work, managed to have training in active bystandership

included in a consent degree signed by New Orleans and its police department with the justice department, agreeing to changes in police training. New Orleans has a tragic history of violence by police against community members. Mary Howell is a civil rights attorney who, because there were no criminal prosecutions of violent police officers, brought many civil suits against the police and the city. Very recently, people she represented whose relatives police killed during and right after Hurricane Katrina finally received a substantial settlement from the city and a very rare apology from the mayor (Litten, 2017). Despite this history, she now closely works with the police on their EPIC (Ethical Policing Is Courageous) program, the name for the active bystandership project. This is another lesson: Adversarial relations can be conducted in a manner that makes later collaboration possible. This was perhaps made more possible by the consent degree and a new police chief.

The police department was obligated, but also fully committed itself, to train officers in active bystandership. Starting with the training that I developed for California and working with consultants like me, as well as others, they created their own version of the training. By September 2017, most officers had received initial training. Their version, in addition to protecting members of the community, stressed, more than my original program, the benefits to police officers and their families. Stopping a fellow officer from harmful and illegal conduct prevents the possible criminal prosecution of that officer as well as of the passive bystander (Aronie & Lopez, 2017). Creating ethical policing also avoids the psychological strain of being part of a corrupt system and keeping quiet while some officers act illegally. Being part of such systems may contribute to the high incidence of alcohol and drug abuse and suicide among police.

The leaders in the New Orleans police department are totally committed to this program. The police chief, Michael Harrison, said at a meeting with the judge overseeing the program, which Mary Howell attended, that he wears his EPIC pin (which participants receive at the end of their training) all the time "as a sign of a contract he has made with his officers . . . if anyone sees him about to do something wrong, he is asking them to intervene . . . regardless of rank . . . and that is what the pin signifies" (M. Howell, personal communication, May 24, 2017).

One remaining challenge is evaluation. A formal evaluation in New Orleans has not been possible because as part of the consent degree, other changes have also been introduced to police training. In response to articles about the training in active bystandership in the *New York Times*, (Robertson, 2016) and elsewhere (Aronie & Lopez, 2017), a large number of police departments want to use the training, which would make evaluation possible. A conference to introduce them to it will take place in April, 2018.

But anecdotal reports by police and community members are coming in. As one New Orleans commander described an event at a demonstration, "Pro monument protestors were screaming insults at the police . . . when officers saw a fellow officer about to lose it, (I) saw them step in, put their hands on his shoulder, tell him to step back to cool off" (M. Howell, personal communication, May 24, 2017). Jonathan Aronie, the court-appointed administrator of the court order, reported,

A sergeant told me . . . one of her officers had an incident a day or two after she took EPIC training. She was involved in an arrest of a very

resistant subject. The subject spit in her face. She did not strike back, although she conceded she came close to doing so. She confided in the sergeant following the incident, "I had to EPIC myself. I'm not sure I would have been able to resist if I hadn't just had EPIC training." (J. Aronie, personal communication, July 23, 2017)

This relates to an effect of the training I have also observed in the training of students (see below). Training in active bystandership, which includes discussion of the impact on people who are harmed and the motivations of harmdoers, even without intervention can reduce the likelihood of harmful actions. Mary Howell keeps herself deeply informed about police-related events in New Orleans, and she also wrote, "To my knowledge we didn't have any real incidents of police over-reaction—with one exception early on but that was quickly addressed" (M. Howell, personal communication, May 24, 2017).

Evaluation was possible in another Training of Active Bystanders that my associates and I developed to prevent or stop harassment, intimidation, and bullying of fellow students in schools. The curriculum for the training elaborated, to a greater degree, elements that are part of the other trainings as well: understanding why someone would engage in unjustified harmful behavior; understanding the inhibitors of active bystandership, such as diffusion of responsibility, pluralistic ignorance, potential costs, and devaluation of those who need help; skills in intervening in the least forceful manner that may be effective; using, among other techniques, role-playing (extensively used in the training in New Orleans); and engaging other bystanders as allies (for details of the training, see Staub, 2015, Chapter 16; for the complete curriculum, see www.ervinstaub.com).

Eighth and 10th grade students and adults were trained to be trainers. Then student-adult pairs trained over 600 eighth and 10th graders in two schools in adjoining cities. In many of the sessions, there was an observer to assess, for later feedback, the extent to which the training followed the design.

An evaluation study compared the frequency of negative behavior before, and about 6 months after the end of the training, with such behavior by students in two comparable schools in neighboring cities. There was a 20% decrease in negative behavior by students who were trained compared with students who were not. In addition, anecdotal reports indicated other positive effects. For example, students reported to administrators a student who talked about engaging in violence in the school, and the students attributed this active bystandership to the training. The effects of being trainers, which may have been even greater, were only studied in interviews, in qualitative evaluation. One of a number of informative comments was, "I used to do such things (bullying) and never thought about its effects on the other person" (Staub, 2015, Chapter 16).

One lesson is that studying both student and adult trainers, and police trainers, would be valuable. Teaching others seemed to have positive effects, possibly an example of learning by doing, as in my studies described earlier (Staub, 1979, 2015). In this instance, not only the positive action of teaching but also its content would have contributed to positive changes in trainers.

Another lesson is the importance of positive participation by leaders. In the Stanford Prison study, there were cameras in the "jail" set up in the basement of the Stanford psychology department, and Professor Zimbardo, the Superintendent, and his assis-

tants observed the guards' abusive behavior, without taking any action (Staub, 2007a; Zimbardo, 2007). This allows the evolution of increasingly abusive behavior. The opposite can also be true: Superiors can guide the evolution of positive action. They must be part of any efforts at system change, as they have been in New Orleans. A third lesson for creating culture and behavior change is the engagement of community stakeholders. In New Orleans, community members have been involved, and police officers were part of designing the training and leading trainings. In our school program, before we began, we had extensive meetings with the superintendents of the two school systems, principals, and relevant staff members. Knowledgeable outsiders as advisors and local stakeholders will ideally work together.

Applying Research and Theory III: Reconciliation and the Prevention of Violence—Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo

Sometime in 1995, a man who had read *The Roots of Evil*, and was part of a small organization in Washington D.C., the Friends of Raoul Wallenberg, was traveling through our area and asked me to lunch. He persuaded me to organize a conference with the "Friends," which took place in Sweden in 1997, called "Options for the Prevention of Genocide." Our experience at this conference inspired me and my associate, Laurie Anne Pearlman, to go to Rwanda.

I invited Charles Murigande to the conference in Sweden. He was the government official in Rwanda who, in 1995, invited me to Rwanda to a conference that considered how the country could move on after the genocide of 1994. I was in India at the time at a small conference with, and for, the Dalai Lama and could not go. But our conference was already in preparation and I invited the Dalai Lama to it. He accepted, which led to a set of complex events. My role for, and in, the conference was to develop its substantive content and agenda and invite people; the role of the "Friends" was to find a venue, generate funding, and also to invite people. At first, everyone was pleased that the Dalai Lama would come. But at a planning meeting with one of the Friends, he told me that they had disinvited the Dalai Lama.

A main funding source was going to be the Wallenberg family, who are sometimes referred to as the "Swedish Rockefellers." They had substantial business interests in China, and because China is extremely hostile to the Dalai Lama, the decision was made to disinvite him. This action was understandable given possible business consequences for the Wallenbergs, but also ironic, given the history of Raoul Wallenberg, as well as unacceptable to me. We engaged in a process, supported by outside "bystanders" who encouraged us. In the end, with apologies, we invited the Dalai Lama again. He came and gave an inspiring talk. The importance of speaking out, discussion, and support by outside parties for resolving a conflict was evident in this process.

For a long time in Rwanda, the Tutsis were dominant. After World War I, the Belgians ruled Rwanda, and they elevated the Tutsis to rule on their behalf, which they did in an oppressive manner. In 1959, there was a Hutu uprising, and since then, the majority Hutus (85% of a population of about 8 million) had ruled the country, with occasional violence against Tutsis, some of which amounted to mass killing. In 1990, a Tutsi rebel group entered from Uganda and began to fight the government army.

There was a peace process and peace accords in 1993. In April 1994, the President's plane was shot down, and a genocide began, in which about 700,000 Tutsis and 50,000 Hutus—mostly those regarded as political opponents—were killed by the army and Hutu militias, called the Interahamwe (Des Forges, 1999). Much of the killing was done with machetes, person to person. Charles Murigande deeply affected everyone at the conference with his description of the terrible events in the genocide.

Our participants at the conference in Sweden engaged with several instances of group violence, which we discussed in small groups, using background materials my students and I had prepared. At the end of the conference, we asked participants, again meeting in small groups, to commit themselves to work for the prevention of violence, in the United States or other places.

Charles Murigande invited me and Laurie Anne Pearlman, a clinical psychologist (who has also been my life partner since 1992) specializing in research on and treatment of trauma (e.g., Pearlman & Caringi, 2009; Pearlman & Saakvitne, 1995), to come to Rwanda to help with healing and reconciliation. During the discussion in our small group, she and I committed ourselves to do so. On returning home, serendipity entered. Two different psychologists sent me information about a call for proposals on forgiveness by the John Templeton Foundation. We applied for and received a grant on Healing, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation in Rwanda.

Our work in Rwanda—which began in January 1999, expanded to Burundi and the Congo, and is still ongoing in all three countries—probably would not have happened without the active bystandership of a prominent social psychologist, David Myers. He was a member of the final panel at the John Templeton Foundation that was to select the proposals to be funded. He knew we had applied, and he knew my work, as he had written in his textbooks about it. He was surprised when he did not see our proposal in the final group. He asked to look at it and found a clerical (computational) error. When it was corrected, ours was among the top proposals.

Before we first went to Rwanda, we organized a meeting in Boston with Rwandans living in the Boston area, and with experts on Rwanda, to inform ourselves about Rwandan culture. We gained valuable information, but also information about the culture that was no longer valid after the genocide, such as people not talking about their feelings to anyone except intimate family members. The intensity of pain was so great that many Tutsis, members of the victim group, would tell us about their losses immediately upon meeting us. This was the case with taxi drivers, with a young man we met on a dark night on an empty street on the day of our arrival as we walked from one hotel to another, and even with high-level government officials once we had an even limited relationship to them.

We arrived in Rwanda early in January 1999. I am almost foolhardy in terms of my limited anxiety about physical danger. But I had intense nightmares the night before we started on our trip. There was still violence in Rwanda, as perpetrators who had escaped to Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) made incursions into northern Rwanda, and they were killing Tutsis while the Tutsi government fought them. Friends and colleagues in the United States were telling us not to go because of the danger. And the collaborator whom Charles Murigande had recommended to us was not communicating, so we did not know whether he

would meet us at the airport or whether we would have a hotel room. All of this, added to my personal history, might explain the nightmares.

Arriving in Rwanda, we experienced people as still deeply traumatized. Many seemed frozen—the expressions on their faces, the way they moved or remained motionless for long periods of time. Because outsiders were only allowed to work in the country in collaboration with a local organization, our collaborator (who was at the airport when we arrived and had reserved a hotel room) introduced us to the director of an organization with which we were initially to collaborate. One day, we traveled with him and his wife in their small truck, with two boys in the open back of the truck. They were the sons of the director's sister, who was a Tutsi, killed by her Hutu husband during the genocide. Such terrible things were not uncommon during the genocide, even parents in mixed marriages killing their own children.

We intended to set up a free-standing intervention and its evaluation, but within 48 hours changed our plans. We realized that to have lasting impact, we would have to work through local institutions. In the next couple of days, we visited eight of them.

We invited them to a 1-day meeting to discuss what we had to offer. We were perhaps the first Western individuals, rather than staff of large organizations such as Catholic Relief Services, who came after the genocide to help. We were usually very warmly welcomed. But in one group, a widows group, the director needed to be certain that we cared and understood their situation. This was a very rare occasion when I mentioned that I was also the survivor of a genocide.

At the meeting in the morning, we presented what we had to offer, which included information about the influences that lead to genocide, and understanding trauma and healing. These were the topics of most intense interest, and in the afternoon we discussed them in greater detail. We worked with these organizations, all of which worked with groups in the community, to set up a training or workshop for their staff in the summer.

During this first visit we also met with government officials. We were invited to one of the first activities of the newly established National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. They held meetings around the country to ask people what they would require for reconciliation. We went to a meeting for women in Kigali, who came in large numbers, colorfully dressed for the occasion. Many of them were widows: Among the things they said included that in the genocide, their husbands were killed and their property and livelihood were destroyed. They needed material support to care for their children and be able to send them to school (which, at that time required fees; since then, the government has made schooling free).

Beginning that summer and continuing for the next 9 years, we conducted trainings and workshops with varied groups on our trips to Rwanda two to three times a year. In addition to the staff of the eight organizations, we had workshops for community leaders, members of the media, national leaders—government ministers, advisors of the president, members of the Supreme Court and parliament—as well as the staff of the Unity and Reconciliation Commission, which also helped us to arrange trainings.

In the first workshop, we offered information about the origins of genocide, as I briefly described it earlier. Rwandans had a deep need to understand how what happened to them could happen. But we also believed that survivors coming to see that genocide is the

outcome of understandable human processes, even if this outcome was terrible, would change their perception of perpetrators as simply evil. This would make it more possible for them to reconcile and to act to prevent future violence. We also thought that understanding would help reduce the shame of members of the perpetrator group (there were no actual perpetrators in our trainings), and perhaps the guilt of some of them, just enough that they would be able to engage constructively with members of the victim group, and express their group's and perhaps their own responsibility as bystanders, as well as their regret. We also discussed in this first long—9 days—workshop the traumatic impact of the violence, on survivors, perpetrators, and passive bystanders. We gave lectures and engaged in discussion in our large group, and participants did many things in small groups, whose members reported back to the large group for further discussion. We did role-plays, which Rwandans seem to enjoy and do very well. In small groups, participants also discussed what happened to them during the genocide.

We had both informal evaluation, at the end of each day and after the last day, and a formal evaluation study. In the informal evaluation, participants said things like, “so this was not God’s punishment of us” and “If we know how such violence comes about, we can act to prevent it.” For the study, our Rwandan staff, now including two research assistants, organized community groups. There were three conditions: *treatment groups*, which were led by participants in our training; *treatment control groups*, led by people from the same organizations who did not participate in our workshop; and *no treatment control*, who only participated in assessments. In the treatment groups, our participant-leaders used an integration of the approach in our seminar and their customary approach, which we worked on in the workshop. There were several subgroups in each of our conditions, for example, those whose leaders included a religious orientation and those who did not.

We assessed these groups on a variety of dimensions three times: before any treatment, immediately after, and 2 months after the end of treatment. There was significant decrease in trauma symptoms, increase in understanding genocide, increase in the acceptance of the other group (e.g., “I can work with them for the sake of our children”), and in conditional forgiveness (“I can forgive them if they acknowledge what they did”) in the treatment group from before the treatment to 2 months afterward compared with the other two groups. There were no differences immediately after the treatment. Their experience in the treatment group most likely reactivated participants’ experience of the genocide, and the effects appeared once these emotional reactions subsided (Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005; see also Staub, 2011).

In subsequent workshops, we also included information about reconciliation, and engaged more with approaches to healing. Having discussed conditions that could reduce as well as increase violence in a group, we divided national leaders into small groups and asked them to consider legislation they had just introduced or planned to introduce, and evaluate the extent to which it might help prevent or contribute to violence. In the media group, we asked them to write news reports in ways that would not incite but, when possible, help prevent violence—for example, by decreasing the division between “us” and “them” and the devaluation of “them” (Staub, 2011; Staub & Pearlman, 2006).

We were encouraged by many people, including the national leaders we trained, to expand the reach of our work. We invited George Weiss, a producer of film and TV who lived in Amsterdam, to join us in Rwanda to produce educational radio programs. Over time, he created an organization, LaBenevolencija Humanitarian Tools Foundation, for this work.

We developed informational programs and a radio drama. We spent many hours in Kigali, sitting with the staff hired for the project, working out the details of our prototype radio drama *Musekweya* (New Dawn). We created a storyline, its central element being conflict and violence between two neighboring villages. There is a famine, and people from the poorer village, led by an angry leader and his followers, attack the better off village, which later retaliates in a counterattack. There are also positive active bystanders in both villages. There is a Romeo and Juliet story between the sister of the bad leader and a young man in the other village, both of them constructive bystanders. We created communication messages—brief statements of the central principles we wanted to communicate about the origins of violence, trauma, reconciliation, and prevention. Some examples are as follows (Staub & Pearlman, 2009, Table 1):

Life problems in a society frustrate basic needs and can lead to scapegoating and destructive ideologies.

Genocide evolves as individuals and groups change as a result of their actions.

Devaluation increases the likelihood of violence while humanization decreases it.

The healing of psychological wounds helps people live more satisfying lives and makes unnecessary defensive violence less likely.

Passivity facilitates the evolution of harmdoing whereas actions by people inhibit it.

Rwandan writers, initially led by Western producers, later by Rwandans, wrote weekly episodes, with the educational content guided by the communication messages. The radio drama began to broadcast in May 2004, and it is still ongoing. The fictional villages over the years moved to reconciliation, and then joined to prevent new violence by others in the region. The episodes were translated into English, and Laurie Pearlman and I initially read and commented on the educational content, on the basis of which the episodes were revised as necessary. In 2006, radio dramas were introduced into Burundi, and then in the eastern part of the DRC. After a few years, the new storyline was created every couple of years by groups that included local stakeholders. We also created informational programs about the origins of genocide, justice, and other matters. Sometime in 2005, two of my then students, Johanna Vollhardt and Rezarta Bilali, and then Adin Thayer, joined us in providing feedback on the educational content of the episodes. Later, Johanna and Rezarta did further evaluation research in both Rwanda and the Congo (Bilali & Vollhardt, 2013, 2015), and Adin continues to participate in storyline workshops and training the staff in educational content. We, the initiators, over the last 5 years or so, increasingly took a back seat. The project, led by George Weiss, is continuing to thrive.

A complex but extensive evaluation study of the radio drama in Rwanda found a variety of positive effects after the first year. There were six treatment groups around the country, whose members listened to Musekeweya (Paluck, 2009; Staub & Pearlman, 2009; see also Staub, 2011). Members of six control groups listened to an alternative radio drama. Participants in the control group agreed not to listen to the weekly broadcasts of Musekeweya; in exchange, at the end of the year, they would receive cassettes of all the broadcasts and a cassette recorder. Members of all groups received these. The evaluation study found that members of the control groups lacked crucial knowledge, indicating that they had not listened to the programs.

Those who listened to the radio drama expressed more empathy for varied groups—victims, survivors, perpetrators, bystanders, leaders. They said they would communicate what they believe to others, and did so, by saying the same thing both to an individual interviewer and in a focus group, for example, about the level of mistrust in their community. Those in the control condition did not. They admitted, for example, distrust to the interviewer but not in the focus group. Those who listened to Musekeweya participated more in reconciliation activities, engaging with people in the other group, whereas those in the control group mainly advocated reconciliation.

After the end of the study, there was a party in each of the 12 groups, during which they received the tapes and cassettes. During the party, in an unobtrusive measure seemingly not part of the project, they were to decide who would hold these materials. In all six control groups, one person suggested that they give them to the village leader, and this was immediately accepted. Such a suggestion was also made in each of the six treatment groups, but others disagreed, the group discussed it, and decided that a member of the group would hold it for the group. This indicated that in this very “authority-oriented” (Staub, 1989a, 2011) country, the study accomplished one of our aims: to lessen the influence of authorities.

In working there, we almost inevitably became involved in ideological-political issues that are relevant to healing and reconciliation. From the time the Tutsi rebels invaded the country, and now as Tutsis rule the country, they propagated an ideology of unity: ‘There are no Tutsis and Hutus—these divisions have caused our conflict and the genocide—we are all Rwandans.’ This became so intensely held by them that when, in our training of leaders, we talked about divisions between groups, they said, about 7 years after the genocide, “But we have no groups in Rwanda.” It was only after long discussion that they came to the view that perhaps there are no biologically different groups, but there are social differences and negative attitudes of Tutsis and Hutus toward each other (Staub & Pearlman, 2006).

The government has strongly disapproved and even punished people talking about Tutsis and Hutus, under laws against “divisionism” and “genocidal ideology.” But people in Rwanda continued to see each other, and identified each other, at least to us outsiders, as Hutu and Tutsi. Instead of attempting to impose a single identity, propagating a dual identity (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009) e.g., Hutu-Rwandan is likely to work better.

An ideology of unity is seemingly constructive, but from our psychological perspective, the way it was used seemed a hindrance to reconciliation. The government position made it impossible for Tutsis and Hutus to engage with and discuss their differences and issues. When I said that to the editor of the major newspaper there

in an interview, he said he could not write that—his prime minister would not like it. I suggested that he identify me as responsible for saying it, and he did publish it. In various ways, this policy has continued. In addition, although there have been several justice processes with the perpetrators of the genocide, there has been no mention in the country and no discussion of the killing of large numbers of Hutus. This is also a barrier to reconciliation. Also, the government has not allowed a serious challenge in the election of the President—Paul Kagame has been elected to a third term—or, in general, any challenge to Tutsi political rule.

Still, the actual long-term effects of these government policies provide an experiment. Perhaps persistent peace, combined with Rwanda’s substantial economic advance, and efforts to create equal educational and economic opportunities—to various degrees at work in Rwanda—will change attitudes by Hutus and Tutsis toward each other, even under political oppression.

There are a variety of lessons from this work. It is essential to show and feel respect for the experience and knowledge of local people. One gains from their understanding of the culture and their experience of, and perspective on, the issues. This was one reason that, in our first workshop, we worked on integrating our perspective and the approaches participants used with groups. But it is also essential for an outsider to form his or her own judgment and use his or her knowledge. For example, it was widely believed by people that the genocide was the result of ignorance and bad leaders. This was also propagated by government leaders, presumably so that people would not fear the possibility of recurring genocide, now that they had “good leaders.” Our presentation and discussion of the influences leading to genocide showed that this simple view was partly incorrect (ignorance) and partly insufficient (yes, bad leaders are problematic, but the origins of genocide are much more complex). Another lesson was that even when a group or government wants reconciliation, psychological and political processes may lead to counterproductive policies.

Cultural differences can be challenging, and it is important to understand what is the result of the culture and what is purely personal. Rwandans tend to be intelligent and hardworking. But they tended to tell us, perhaps because we were regarded as people with authority, what they thought we wanted to hear. Except for leaders, questioning you is a nearly superhuman effort for them. Our first Rwandan associate was repeatedly not at his phone at agreed-upon times; another associate was more than once an hour late to meetings. Neither of this is unusual. But interestingly, in our workshops, participants arrived on time, even if they came from far away. There are also different expectations in interpersonal realms. When someone told us about a challenging matter, we tended to empathize; they wanted advice, as specific as possible.

Applying Research and Theory IV: Preventing Violence and Promoting Positive Relations Between the Dutch and Muslims in Amsterdam

In 2004, Theo van Gogh, a Dutch film director and TV personality, and Hirshi Ali, a Somali woman who was then a member of the Dutch parliament and a committed activist for the rights of Muslim women, prepared a TV program about women in Islam. The program began with the image of the naked back of a woman, with text on it from the Koran. Enraged by the program, a Muslim

man killed van Gogh and left a note threatening Hirshi Ali. This was followed, in this peaceful country, by hundreds of attacks on Muslim schools, mosques, and churches.

The mayor of Amsterdam, where these events took place, organized a conference on how to address Dutch–Muslim relations in the city. I was invited to speak, and then invited to make proposals to the city government on how to improve Dutch–Muslim relations and thereby prevent future violence. The intermediary who proposed my involvement was Jerome de Lange. During the first few years of our radio programs, he was the First Secretary at the Dutch embassy in Kigali. A Dutch grant to Radio LaBenevolencija, whose main office is located in Amsterdam, provided partial support for our programs.

I met with the mayor's Chief of Staff and her staff in a mutual informational meeting and interviewed some other people. Some people were really scared. A professor of education asked me, "Are we all in danger?" I also read a great deal of material about Dutch–Muslim relations in the Netherlands, including yearly reports of a government agency and research articles. The Dutch staff of LaBenevolencija helped me gather information. I made a presentation of my understanding of the situation and thoughts about addressing it to members of the city government and some other influential people in the city. Soon afterward, I provided them with a written report of my proposals and the rationale for them, based on my understanding of the situation, relevant research, and my prior work. Later I turned this into an article (Staub, 2007b).

I made 11 proposals, each followed by extensive discussion of relevant research and applied experience that provide the basis for the proposal.

De Lange noted an important lesson: that members of the city government whom I had not directly engaged along the way were skeptical at first. However, once they had heard my talk and had the written proposals, they supported their implementation, according to de Lange (2007), "because of its in depth analysis of the origins of hostility and violence and concrete proposals for action" (p. 252). In working with local groups, it is highly desirable for an outsider proposing interventions to bring everyone into the discussion of the problems and their solutions. If local stakeholders feel excluded, they may sabotage the work. In Rwanda, after the first year or two, the ongoing storyline of the radio drama has been developed every 2 years by groups consisting of both staff and local stakeholders.

I will list those proposals that Jerome de Lange (2007) specifically mentioned in a follow-up article to mine, describing actions the city government took to implement the proposals. Actions to promote positive relations are usually relevant to several principles.

Proposal 1: Humanizing the "other" is essential to overcome devaluation and the danger of violence.

Proposal 2: The Dutch and Muslim leaders and communities should engage in dialogue aimed at creating a constructive, inclusive ideology that includes mutual understanding, accommodation, and a shared vision of a good society to which all groups can contribute and help create.

Proposal 7: It is important to foster deep contact (significant engagement) between people across group lines as an avenue to overcoming devaluative stereotypes and hostility.

Except for one or two small enclaves in the city, where there was interaction among young people, the ethnic Dutch population of Amsterdam (and the Netherlands) and its Muslim population had extremely little contact with each other. As a result of housing patterns, with groups living in separate areas, schools were segregated. Most of the information Muslims had about the Dutch came from TV, including free sexual practices that are deeply contrary to the values of Islam. They also experienced discrimination—real and perceived. The Dutch, in turn, were affected by roving groups of mostly teenage Muslims who harassed store owners and passersby, by their resentment of social and financial support for Muslims, and their stereotype of Muslim criminal behavior (Staub, 2007b).

The city government instituted several practices to promote connection between members of the groups. It established a study center that was to provide information about Muslims to non-Muslims. During Ramadan, the government organized a festival, with "many meetings and debates about Islam in the Netherlands. . . . and Muslim families inviting non-Muslims to share dinner with them after sunset" (de Lange, 2007, p. 253). During the year, days of dialogue were organized. In addition, "children of migrants interviewed their parents about their background and migration story," which were shared on the Internet and publications (p. 253). A "soap" series was in production on local TV, somewhat similar in conception to our educational radio drama in Rwanda. To combat segregation, meetings were set up between children in so-called Black (Muslim) and White (non-Muslim) schools, with the project called "Welcome to My Neighborhood" being extended to more areas of the city.

These activities were also relevant to several of my other proposals, such as Proposal 6:

Proposal 6: Promoting active, positive bystandership by all segments of the population—leaders, the media, community organizations, individual citizens—makes the evolution of hostility and violence less likely. Every person, or organization, can be active in fostering constructive engagement by others.

In addition to activities described above, billboards around the city encouraged young Muslims to call a special organization set up to combat discrimination when they witness it. The police received special training to be aware of discrimination.

Proposal 10 noted that it is crucial to develop inclusive caring in children as an aspect of long-term peacebuilding. This means caring that extends beyond the boundaries of their own group, however that group is defined, and specifically caring about members of other groups in their society, including previously hostile groups. In addition, especially for children who are members of groups that have suffered from victimization and other trauma, it is important to facilitate "altruism born of suffering" (Staub, 2005, 2011; Staub & Vollhardt, 2008). Further, an "organization has been set up to give advice to school personnel who are confronted with polarization and radicalization in their classes" (de Lange, 2007, p. 254). The various activities and organizations the city has

created are also relevant to Proposal 3, to facilitate psychological healing to prevent the negative consequences of painful past experiences.

This project shows the potential of cooperation between authorities and “experts.” It shows the active bystandership of city leaders in responding to difficult events. They initiated my involvement and used information based on scholarship and experience as they took significant actions to improve relations between groups. But what if leaders have no motivation, or initiative, or understanding of how to access, and then use, information relevant to a situation that requires action? Perhaps psychology organizations, such as American Psychological Association, American Psychological Society, Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, or International Society for Political Psychology, or the Peace Psychology Division of APA, should establish task forces, which can reach out to authorities in difficult times and offer such service.

It is Not All Roses: Cold Cuts in Hungary

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which also meant freedom for the East European countries that it had dominated, there was a lot of antagonism between people in the media on the left and right in Hungary. Someone approached me with the idea to go there and attempt to bring them together, some form of conflict resolution between the two sides.

I went to Hungary and had many individual meetings with TV and print journalists and producers on both sides, including leading personalities. I discussed with them the issue of the divisions in the media—their differences as well as antagonism. I proposed a meeting of media people on the left and right. Each person I talked to agreed.

I rented a hall and arranged for high-quality cold cuts and salads to be brought in. At the appointed time, everyone on the left, the people I talked to and others they contacted, had arrived. One person on the right showed up. I learned afterward that one of the influential people on the right decided the day of the meeting not to come, and initiated a phone chain discouraging others from coming. The one person who came did not get the message.

This was my earliest direct engagement with groups in conflict. In the general mood of disappointment it did not occur to me to have a discussion with the people who came about strategies to improve the relationship between the groups. I think they saw the people in the media on the right like Democratic members of Congress came to see Republican members during the Obama years—there was no way to move them. Still, a discussion, even if starting with bitterness, might have turned constructive. One lesson for me is to reinforce, again and again, people’s positive intentions—in this case, and not assume that once they agree to come to such a meeting, it is a done deal. Another is to be ready to try even for the smallest possible gain—in this case, working with the one group that came on strategies of overcoming hostility. And perhaps a more general one—be ready for all contingencies.

Applying Research and Theory V: Aiming to Create Change Through Lectures and as an Expert Witness

In some of my lectures, I aimed to promote change in conflict and postconflict situations. This was the case with a lecture on the

origins of hostility and violence that I gave to about 500 people in Belgrade, very soon after NATO first bombed Serb positions to stop attacks on the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, which had been under a long siege.

I was invited to Belgrade to give a talk on my research on the roots of caring and helping, but my hosts also arranged this second lecture. There was consecutive translation, after each few sentences. I started by saying, “I will talk about the origins of hostility and violence between groups, but I will not apply it to the circumstances in the former Yugoslavia. I am inviting you, the audience, to do the application to your situation.” I have used this approach before—for example, in Israel—and found it effective. In Rwanda also, after talking about the influences leading to genocide, we asked participants in trainings to apply it to their own situation.

After my talk, there was pandemonium in the room. People were shouting at each other—especially members of two groups on different sides of the room. As my translator told me, some of them were shouting, “We did not know what our people were doing!” Others were shouting that one could get it from CNN (which, at that time, did not transmit to Serbia but could be picked up from neighboring countries). Some people shouted that CNN lies. The intense “discussion” on this and other topics by a substantial number of people went on for some time.

I was then interviewed by a journalist who asked, “So do you support the NATO bombing?” I was concerned. I read in the paper that there was one (or more—I did not remember) murder of someone who publicly opposed Serb actions. But after hesitating, I said “yes.” Serbs were attacking Bosnian Muslims, committing atrocities, and there seemed no other way to stop it.

After more substantial NATO bombings, the Serb leader, Slobodan Milošević, entered into negotiations, leading to the Dayton Agreement, which ended the fighting. Milošević was then ousted by huge nonviolent demonstrations by students and workers, who blocked the streets of Belgrade. Still later, he was tried in The Hague, and died in prison before his trial ended.

I had educational aims in other lectures as well. I gave the opening talk at the international conference in 2004 that initiated the 10th anniversary memorialization of the Rwandan genocide (followed by a talk by President Paul Kagame). I discussed the influences that lead to genocide and mentioned how victimized groups tend to respond to new threat with the use of force, even when this is unnecessary. Between World War I and 1959, when there was a Hutu uprising, under Belgian overrule, Tutsis treated Hutus very badly (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001). When I interviewed, in prison, the woman who was the justice minister during the genocide, the first thing she said was that the reason for the genocide was slavery—meaning the slavery of Hutus under Tutsi rule.

My primary purpose in talking at the conference about formerly victimized groups at times engaging in unnecessary “defensive” violence was to help Tutsis consider that their own victimization in the genocide might increase the possibility that they would harm others. I did this in part because Rwanda under Tutsi rule has become a militarily powerful country. The military killed many Hutus civilians in the Congo, when they invaded there to stop former genocidaires from attacking into Rwanda. But the next day, Mrs. Kagame approached me and asked, “So are we responsible for creating the genocide?” My response was, and is, that past victimization *does make harming more likely*, but far from

inevitable. Individuals and groups still have choices. Subsequent Hutu governments could have worked on improving relations between Tutsis and Hutus, but mostly they oppressed and at times killed Tutsis.

Furthermore, it is seemingly always a variety of influences that combine in leading to extreme group violence. In Rwanda, these included economic decline due to the substantial drop in the international markets of the prices of Rwanda's primary exports, tin and coffee; for the first time, new political parties were allowed, and many were created, leading to substantial political chaos; the strengthening of anti-Tutsi "Hutu Power" ideology; the civil war; and more (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Staub, 1999, 2011). Moreover, some individuals and groups that have been victimized develop "altruism born of suffering," turning their suffering into caring about and helping others. This requires healing and support from others (Staub, 2005, 2011; Staub & Vollhardt, 2008).

I gave many lectures over the years, and all had, of course, educational aims, but the aims were usually not as focused on bringing about behavior change as the work I have described in this article. The way that I structured the talk in Belgrade, I hoped to generate active bystandership, and in Rwanda, to prevent harm-doing by the Tutsi government. But the series of talks I gave, for example, at yearly conferences arranged by the State Department on the prevention of genocide had a less focused aim: the hope that the U.S. government would seriously attend to prevention. Although President Obama created, in 2011, an Atrocity Prevention Board, this is still an unfulfilled hope.

Another attempt on my part to create change using information was my participation in one of the Abu Ghraib trials as an expert witness. I agreed to be a defense witness because I wanted to show the military tribunal that the guards who abused prisoners acted as part of, and were influenced by, the system. I was asked to be a witness for Sgt. Javal Davis, the only African American defendant. The charges included stomping on detainees' hands and bare feet as they were lying in a pile on the ground assembled by the guards, including him, and jumping on that pile of detainees. He was also charged with being a passive bystander to others' actions. Actions by other guards included hitting a prisoner with a metal bar, forcing prisoners to strip and masturbate, ordering a pair of detainees to simulate fellatio, placing a leash around the neck of a detainee, having dogs attack prisoners, holding the dogs back in the last moment, and more.

Sargent Davis had already pled guilty, so the only issue was the sentence he would receive. In the room where the proceedings took place were the judge, two prosecutors, a military and a civilian defense council, and the members of varied ranks of the military tribunal sitting in two rows. In the audience, on the side, were Sargent Davis's parents, his estranged wife and his young child, and a good number of other people, including military personnel who were part of the court system.

The abuse of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib was outrageous. But trying nine guards, without judicial procedures against those who exerted systematic influence leading to their actions, was just as outrageous (Denner, 2005; Hersh, 2009). My aim was to provide information about the context that led to their actions.

Attacks and attempted uprisings in some parts of the prison created frustration and anger among the guards. Investigators, whose job was to get information and confessions from the pris-

oners, told the guards to soften them up for their interrogation. Such "requests" were initiated and approved by the Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. Superior officers witnessed abusive behavior, for example, prisoners marched through a compound naked and put in a cell naked. They did nothing, treating it as normal. Violence usually evolves, becoming more intense over time, unless there are constraining forces. Superior officers not setting and enforcing standards of appropriate conduct allows a system of violence to develop, as we have also seen with the police—and as it has happened in the Stanford Prison Study (Staub, 2007a).

One of the guards was identified as an instigator and leader, Cpl. Charles Grainer—he received a 10-year prison sentence. It has been found in other instances, ranging from the Stanford Prison Study to terrorist groups, that one aggressive person, without control by superiors or other parties, can influence others—and even a whole system. The U.S. military who served as guards in Abu Ghraib had no training as prison guards, which may have made it easier for standards to shift. However, Charles Grainer was a prison guard in the United States before he joined the military, with a number of accusations against him for brutality. He also had a number of documented instances of abuse of his estranged wife, with court orders to stay away from her. There was also evidence of his prejudice against African Americans inmates in the United States. Prejudice against Iraqis by American soldiers in constant interaction with a difficult prison population also likely played a role in the abuse.

Sargent Davis's sentence was a reduction in rank, 6 months in prison, and a bad-conduct discharge. Prison sentences ranged from 10 years to 6 months. Only one defendant received no prison sentence, Spc. Megan Ambuhl, whose rank was reduced to private and who lost half a month's pay.

I cannot assess the influence of my testimony on the members of the tribunal. But some military people in the audience came up to me after the trial and said that my testimony gave them a new understanding of the behavior of the guards.

Final Comments: Information and Experience

I have stressed all along developing positive connections to people in the settings one works in. Local people not only facilitate the work, but especially at far away and in culturally unfamiliar settings, positive connections to them help with understanding the culture, and make the work rewarding, rather than excessively challenging. Such connections also increase the likelihood that the work will fit the culture and be sustainable. Connections to both the people one works with and associates with also help inhibit or reduce vicarious trauma, the effect of substantial exposure to others' trauma (Pearlman & Caringi, 2009; Pearlman & Saakvitne, 1995). Moreover, in Rwanda, it is presumably because of relationships with some high-level officials that we have been allowed to broadcast programs that are at odds with both the authority orientation of the culture and an authority-oriented government.

The positive effects of our interventions, a number of them evident in evaluation studies, show the value of developing interventions based on research and theory. In the interventions I described, we provided information in the context of or in relation to people's actual experience, which made it likely that it would generate what I have called "experiential understanding" (Staub, 2006). In Rwanda, we asked participants to discuss whether, and in

what way, the information about the origins of genocide applied to their experience of the genocide there. The educational content in radio dramas was directly relevant to listeners' experience. In the training of active bystanders, information joined with police or students engaging in or witnessing harmful behavior. In the case of students it sometimes also joined with students being victims of it. Role-plays also connect information with at least "as if" experience. The information I provided in Amsterdam was connected to the circumstances there at that time. The joining of information and experience is likely to lead to deeper and more durable knowledge. As we found in the work described in this article, it contributes to behavior change.

I found, in my early research, the power of the joining of information and experience. In one study, we provided information to people about the properties of electric shocks, which reduced both their physiological and experiential impact when they subsequently received shocks (Staub & Kellett, 1972). In another, I provided information about snakes and their behavior, which added to the influence of progressively exposing individuals to a snake in reducing phobia (Staub, 1968).

This early research related to fear and its elimination was inspired by the courses of Arnold Lazarus at Stanford. In retrospect, it is highly likely that it was also influenced by my early life experience during the Holocaust and under Communism. So was a study on self-control, in which people who administered electric shocks to themselves had much lower heart rate and galvanic skin responses than participants paired with them who received the same intensity shocks but had no control (Staub, Tursky, & Schwartz, 1971). (In neither of my shock studies did we administer strong shocks to people.) Early in my career, wanting to be a real scientist, I avoided thinking about connections between my life and work—which later became completely obvious. It seems that all the work I have done was in part shaped by my life experiences. I wonder to what extent the work of other psychologists and social scientists is influenced by life experience. I know that people who study genocides usually have a personal connection, through family or at least group membership.

The issues of culture is relevant to all the work we have done. Cultural characteristics combine with societal conditions as starting points for group violence. Police culture makes change in police behavior challenging. Children learning what I have referred to as rules of conventional behavior interferes with helping. Environmental conditions are much less likely to create harmful actions if culture promotes positive relations and attitudes toward others. It is both the culture of a society and that of a family that can imbue children with caring and responsibility both for people in and outside their group.

In Rwanda—and Burundi and the Congo—it certainly was our intention to generate culture change—to help people understand and to lessen devaluation of the other, lessen the intense authority orientation of people, and to help with healing and make it less likely that the genocide becomes a "chosen trauma" (Staub, 2011; Volkan, 2004) that defines identity. Proponents of dynamical systems theory (Vallacher, Coleman, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2010) suggest that culture change can take substantial time to manifest itself. Given the Rwandan governmental system, which, while moving people toward equality, is politically and socially oppressive, it is difficult to judge the current state of the culture.

Hopefully, when the system becomes more open, or when conditions make active bystandership essential, whatever cultural changes we have contributed to will manifest themselves.

Relevant to culture change is the role in American psychology of the kind of research and interventions I have described. The field of social psychology and psychology in general has begun to shift, becoming more engaged with issues relevant to group violence and prevention, such as collective victimhood and the experience of inclusive (being open to seeing others also as victims) versus exclusive victimhood (Noor, Vollhardt, Mari, & Nadler, 2017), conflict narratives, forgiveness, and more. There have been significant interventions and applications of psychology by peace psychologists, for example, working to reunite child soldiers with their communities (Wessells, 2009). There is recent interest in interventions by social psychologists, as indicated by symposia on the topic at conferences, and some interventions like work with police on subtle prejudice. But significant interventions that aim toward sustainable change related to conflict (i.e., preventing violence and promoting positive intergroup relations) and their impact evaluations in real-world contexts seem rare (for a more extended discussion, see Bilali & Staub, 2017).

There has been a long history of research on contact between groups to overcome negative attitudes, but contact is often of limited duration or nature, and its effects are mostly evaluated immediately after it took place. But sometimes researchers use naturally occurring situations, such as a 3-week-long summer camp in Maine that brings together youth in conflict situations—Israeli, Palestinian, Serb, Croat, and Bosnian—which had powerful immediate effects but also positive effects 2 to 4 years later, for example, fearing the outgroup less (Worchel & Coutant, 2008). A project in Sri Lanka with Sinhalese and Tamil youth combined contact and peace education. A year later, participants expressed more empathy for the other group and donated more money for poor children in the other group (Malhotra & Liyanage, 2005). Hopefully, applying knowledge to create change in the realm of conflict and evaluating its impact will expand further.

Finally, I have not written about the emotional experience of being in and working in settings where people have been greatly victimized and deeply traumatized. Inevitably, we were deeply affected by such suffering, by the stories we were told, by the visible, palpable pain of people. Empathy is natural, inevitable, and necessary. But in a world of suffering, for me, being actively engaged in trying to help was redemptive. I believe that not only for me but also my associates, what made it possible not to be overwhelmed by the pain was, first, our ongoing efforts to help, balancing empathy and compassion with a focus on what felt like our meaningful and hopefully significant work, and second, connections to associates and the people we worked with.

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